On Christmas morning in 2023, the cargo vessel Genius Star XI was on its way from Vietnam to California, navigating through heavy weather in the North Pacific Ocean while carrying massive lithium-ion batteries, when a fire broke out in the cargo hold.
The crew put out the fire, but then, three days later, as the ship sought refuge at the nearest port in Dutch Harbor, Alaska, another fire started in a second cargo hold. The crew was able to fight the fire, and it was put out the next day. No one was injured, but the incidents aboard the 410-foot-long Genius Star XI caused some $3.8 million in property damage. According to a recent NTSB report, the probable cause of the two fires was improperly secured lashing belts.
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During the storms, the vessel encountered gale-force winds of about 26 knots (30 mph), with gusts above 30 knots (about 35 mph) and swells reaching 19 feet. The conditions caused the Genius Star to roll significantly, and seawater washed into the cargo hatches. As the vessel wrestled with the weather, 41 battery energy storage systems (BESS) units broke loose and suffered internal structural deformation, which led to thermal runaway in three units.
These BESS units were stationary landside power supply units designed to store energy during peak electrical generation and supply power to an electrical grid during low-generation periods. Powin LLC made the units at its Vietnam factory, and had 192 of them aboard the Genius Star XI, as well as 35 Harmonic Adsorption Recuperative Power System (HARPS) heat exchangers.
Each unit had a maximum energy capacity of 800 kilowatt-hours (kWh), weighed about 21,103 pounds and was 11 feet high, 5 feet wide and 8 feet long.
During the storm, several brackets securing the D-rings separated, allowing the BESS units to shift. The separations occurred at the welds between the brackets and the deck.
Coast Guard investigators also found that the hooks on the ends of the ratchet lashing belts were not compatible with the D-rings. The D-rings were too thick and couldn’t be fully seated — on some, only the tip of the hook secured the lashing belts to the D-rings.
Following its investigation, the NTSB determined that the accident could have been prevented with proper procedures and inspections, and stressed the need for crews to follow the cargo securing manual and lashing plan, inspect all cargo during and after loading, and pay close attention to lashing belt hooks, wires and chain falls to verify they are properly seated.
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